Bakshi Finance — Family Office. The information presented in this document is provided for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice, investment marketing, or a substitute for personalised advice tailored to the client. The firm operates as a Family Office serving qualified investors only. The firm’s founder held a licensed investment-advisory practice from 2008 through 2023. The licence was suspended and not renewed; the firm currently does not hold an investment-advisory, investment-marketing or portfolio-management licence.

Nothing herein constitutes a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any security.

Past performance is not indicative of future results. This site does not participate in the investment decision. The decision rests with the client.

Isracard Ltd.

Isracard Ltd. | TASE | Credit Cards · Acquiring · Consumer Credit

Data as of: April 2026 | Primary source: 2025 Annual Report + FY2025 Investor Presentation

ISCD
Research Depth · Standard Credit Cards · Acquirer · Lender
Total Revenue 2025
3,522M ILS
+8.6% Y/Y
Reported Net Income 2025
(40)M ILS
2024: +264M | one-time POSI Run-Off provision
Adjusted Net Income 2025
305M ILS
Adjusted ROE 9.8% | excl. POSI
Credit to Public
8,583M ILS
+18.3% Y/Y | fastest pace in 3 years
CET1 2025
10.7%
2024: 11.9% | regulatory floor 8.0%
Dividend 2025
0 ILS
2024: 99M | 2023: 68M
Market Cap
NIS 4.88B
StockAnalysis (TASE) · 27/04/2026
P/E (TTM)
N/A
Net loss TTM · StockAnalysis
P/B
1.52
StockAnalysis
ROE (TTM)
-1.25%
StockAnalysis
Dividend Yield
TBU
Special distribution skews figure
1 Company Profile

Isracard Ltd. is one of the three Israeli credit-card companies, alongside Cal and Max. The company trades on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (ticker: ISCD, security 1157403, ISIN: IL0011574030) and is a constituent of the TA-125 index. Isracard was separated from Bank Hapoalim in 2020 under the Strom Law (Law to Increase Competition and Reduce Concentration in the Banking Market, 2017). The business is divided into three core lines: Issuing, Acquiring of merchants, and Consumer Credit & Lending. Major event in October 2025: Harel Insurance & Finance acquired the controlling stake in Isracard from Mizrahi-Tefahot Bank — 37.05% of issued share capital for ~ILS 1,246.6M (608.65740 ILS per share). The transaction closed on 24 October 2025 and as of 17 February 2026 Harel is formally identified as the controlling shareholder. The company holds the exclusive American Express licence in Israel — a unique revenue stream not available to Cal or Max. As of year-end 2025: more than 3.7 million active cards, more than 100,000 active merchants, and an annual transaction volume of ~ILS 11.8B. Statutory auditor: KPMG (Somekh Chaikin) — auditor since 1999. CEO and Chairman namesrequires verification — RTL extraction issue from the Hebrew PDF; full names appear in the company’s constitutional pages and on the corporate website.

Activity LineStrategic Role2025 Performance
Card fees, netCore revenue (~71%)2,497M ILS (+9.5% Y/Y)
Net interest incomeRevolving credit & instalments1,461M ILS (+6% Y/Y)
Non-interest financing incomeAdditional financing fees1,036M ILS (+15% Y/Y)
Acquiring~100K active merchantsVolume ~11.8B ILS

Source: 2025 Annual Report (P1728569), FY2025 Investor Presentation (P1728580). Subsidiaries (100%): EuropayIsrael, Future Automation, Payment Solutions.

2 Key Financial Observations

This summary is not a recommendation. It is a factual list of key financial metrics drawn from the audited annual report.

Profitability — Reported vs. Adjusted 2025

MetricReportedAdjusted
Net income (M ILS)(40)305
ROE(1.3%)9.8%
ROE — credit-card activity(0.3%)13.3%
Cost-to-Income93.8%81.7%
EPS (ILS)(0.38)1.22

Balance Sheet & Capital 2025 (M ILS)

Metric20252024
Total assets27,88325,596
Credit to public8,5837,253
Shareholders’ equity3,2023,174
CET110.7%11.9%
Total capital ratio12.4%13.0%

Factual explanation of the reported/adjusted gap: in 2025 the company recorded a one-time provision of ~ILS 345M for the separation of insurance activity (POSI / Run-Off), in addition to a tax adjustment of ~ILS 62M. This provision does not reflect ongoing operating activity but rather an accounting separation of a non-core line. Adjusted net income of ILS 305M and adjusted ROE of 9.8% are the figures that reflect continuing operations.

Credit ratings (17/02/2026): Moody’s Baa1 / S&P A / Fitch A / Midroog Aa2.il — stable outlook from all agencies.

2025 Revenue Mix (M ILS)
Reported vs. Adjusted Net Income (M ILS)
Credit to Public (M ILS)
Adjusted ROE — 5-Year Trend (%)
Regulatory Capital Ratios (%)
Dividend — 3 Years (M ILS)
3 Industry & Competitive Context

Sector — credit cards and payments in Israel. Regulated by the Bank of Israel (Proper Conduct of Banking Business directives 201–211, Basel III for credit-card companies) and by the Israel Securities Authority as a public company. A concentrated market of three players: Isracard, Cal and Max — all undergoing a transition from bank ownership toward insurance / consortium ownership.

CompanyCurrent Owner (2025–2026)Strategic Context
IsracardHarel Insurance (37.05%) — since October 2025Separated from Bank Hapoalim (2020); transferred from Mizrahi-Tefahot to Harel
CalBank Discount — sale process underwayHarel / FIBI / Igud consortium reportedly bidding ~3.75B ILS
MaxClal InsuranceAcquisition completed in the prior cycle

Global comparison: Visa and Mastercard are networks — they do not issue cards and do not bear credit risk. Isracard is an issuer + acquirer + lender. The closest global model is American Express — at a vastly different scale.

4 Risk Factors
RiskFactual Context
Regulation — fee capsInterchange-fee committees operate continuously in Israel. Reductions in interchange fees flow directly to operating margins. Structural pressure that is not expected to abate.
Credit quality — revolving bookAn 8,583M ILS book composed mostly of higher-risk consumer credit. Provisioning ratio 2.61%, write-offs 0.76%. A weaker macro cycle would impact directly.
Interest-rate sensitivityNet interest income of 1,461M ILS is sensitive to Bank of Israel policy. A sharp rate cut would compress the spread. BoI rate in 2025: 4.5%.
Integration risk — HarelControl acquisition closed in October 2025. Strategic, organisational and systems integration take time. Poor execution can erode the value of expected synergies.
FinTech competitionBit (Hapoalim), Pepper Pay (Leumi), Apple Pay, Google Pay offer alternatives that partly bypass the traditional card.
Operational / cyber riskCredit-card companies are a target for cyber attacks. Fraud risk grows with digitalisation. IT spend reached 576M ILS in 2025.
CET1 declineFrom 11.9% to 10.7% in one year. If the trend continues, action will be required (capital raise, growth deceleration, or distribution restraint).
Dependence on AmEx licenceA meaningful competitive advantage — but also a dependence on a single contract with an external partner.
5 Analytical Lens — The Questions We Ask
In professional company analysis, the question is not "is this good?" but rather "through which lenses must this company be examined so that we do not miss what matters most?" At Bakshi Finance, every analysis passes through six lenses.

This framework is intended to structure analysis, not to produce an investment conclusion.
Growth
The credit book grew 18.3% in 2025 (+1.3B ILS) — an unusual pace versus the prior ~2% trajectory. How much of the growth is organic demand versus an active acquisition push? How sustainable is it given that CET1 already declined? Transaction volume rose ~21% — does that reflect rising market share or inflation in the average ticket size?
Profitability
Reported ROE (-1.3%) versus adjusted ROE 9.8%. The 11.1-percentage-point gap is the one-time POSI provision. Adjusted ROE of 9.8% is below large Israeli banks’ ROE (13–17% in 2025) — operating margins in the credit-card sector are structurally lower. What is the normalisation scenario?
Leverage
CET1 fell from 11.9% to 10.7%, total capital ratio from 13.0% to 12.4%. Still above the regulatory floor (8% / 11.5%), but the direction is downward. 2025 capital raises added ~1.25B ILS in bonds + a 2.5B ILS facility from Bank Discount. If growth continues at the same pace — will deceleration be required?
Competitive Position
Three players in the sector, Isracard with the exclusive AmEx licence. A transition from bank ownership to insurance ownership is underway. Harel now controls Isracard; Clal owns Max; Harel is also competing for Cal. What is the difference between a "credit cards under insurance" model and a "credit cards under bank" model? Which distribution channel proves more effective?
Management Quality
2025 capital allocation was directed to growth rather than distribution — a policy shift versus 2023–2024. CEO and Chairman namesrequires verification were not extracted directly from the PDF. Will Harel appoint a new board / CEO? What dividend policy will be set from 2026? Will an explicit adjusted-ROE target be published?
Business Complexity / Risk
Isracard is not Visa/Mastercard. It is a hybrid model between payments and credit — issuer (risk), acquirer (fees), and lender on revolving credit (interest). A material share of revenue is rate-sensitive, which makes the company sensitive to Bank of Israel policy in a manner similar to banks — yet with a much smaller book (8.6B ILS versus hundreds of billions at the large banks).
6 Scenario Framework
Scenarios are descriptive, not predictive. They outline possible conditions, not expected outcomes.
These scenarios carry no probability assessment, no preferred direction, and no expectation regarding which, if any, will materialise.
Constructive Scenario — if the following conditions hold:

Interchange-fee caps are not further reduced in a material way, credit-book growth continues at a more moderate 8–12% (rather than the accelerated 18%), CET1 stabilises around 10.5–11%, the Harel integration succeeds in producing cross-distribution that broadens the customer base, and consumer-credit markets remain stable. Under such conditions, adjusted profit can continue to expand from the 305M ILS base. This is a strategic thesis — not a management commitment.

Base Scenario — if current trends continue:

Interchange-fee caps are gradually reduced by 5–10%, credit-book growth moderates to 7–10%, CET1 stabilises around 10.5%, and the Harel integration progresses but is not transformative. Adjusted profit remains in the 280–330M ILS range, adjusted ROE in the 9–11% range. Dividend may resume from 2026 at ~50% of profit.

Adverse Scenario — if the following risks materialise:

A new fee committee cuts the interchange fee by 15–25%, an adverse credit cycle pushes the provisioning ratio above 3.5% and write-offs above 1.2%, FinTech accelerates erosion of transaction volume, and CET1 continues to fall below 10%. Under such conditions, operating profit contracts materially and the dividend may remain suspended.

Scenarios describe conditions, not forecasts. There is no preferred direction and no probability assessment expressed in this framework.
7 How to Think About This Company
Isracard is not an aggressive growth story and not a technology story. It is an established player in an Israeli oligopoly of three companies, undergoing two structural-accounting events simultaneously in 2025: a one-time loss of ~345M ILS from the separation of insurance activity (POSI), and a change of control from Mizrahi-Tefahot Bank to Harel Insurance & Finance. Anyone reading "net loss of -40M ILS" at the bottom of the annual report without digging beneath it gets a misleading picture of 2025. The reported loss is not the picture of operating activity. Adjusted net income of 305M ILS (adjusted ROE 9.8%, ROE on credit-card activity 13.3%) is the relevant number for the 2025 operating year. The ~345M ILS gap is accounting noise tied to the separation of life-insurance activity — a one-time structural event, not a deterioration in the business. That said, even adjusted ROE is below operating ROE for large Israeli banks (13–17% in 2025), as margins in the credit-card sector are structurally lower.
The Harel acquisition is a structural change, not merely a change of control. Mizrahi-Tefahot held Isracard as a result of the Strom Law (a regulatory transfer) — the bank had no deep synergies with the company. Harel, by contrast, acquired Isracard with a distribution strategy in mind: combining insurance, pension savings and credit cards under a single group. This is a strategic thesis — not a management commitment. The question is not whether the thesis works in the world, but whether the new management can execute on it in Isracard within a short timeframe and without damaging the core business.
The business model is hybrid between payments and credit. Isracard is not Visa/Mastercard. It is not a pure payments network. The company issues cards (carries risk), acquires merchants (fee activity), and provides revolving credit and instalment financing (interest activity). 2025 revenue mix: card fees 2,497M ILS (~71% of revenue), net interest income 1,461M ILS (~41%), financing income 1,036M ILS. That is — a meaningful share of revenue is rate-sensitive, which makes the company sensitive to Bank of Israel policy in a manner similar to banks, yet with a far smaller book (8.6B ILS versus hundreds of billions at the largest banks).
The regulatory environment is a structural constraint — not a temporary threat. Israeli legislation (the Strom Committee, the Beler Committee, interchange-fee committees) continues to compress permissible acquiring and interchange fees. This is structural margin pressure that is not expected to abate. What partially offsets — growth in transaction volume (+21% in 2025) and in the credit book (+18.3%). The capital ratios tell a story of tension between growth and preservation. CET1 fell from 11.9% to 10.7% in one year, and the total capital ratio from 13.0% to 12.4%. Still above the regulatory minima (8% / 11.5%), but the direction is down. The reason: RWA growth (from 25.4 to 28.2B ILS) outpaced capital growth. The company responded with CoCo issuance, subordinated debt and increased borrowing — but if growth continues at the same pace, the company will need to add capital or slow book growth. This is not a crisis — it is a strategic dilemma that warrants monitoring.
What distinguishes professional analysis of Isracard from headlines. A headline will say "Isracard posts loss of 40M ILS". A professional analysis asks: (a) what is the adjusted operating profit, and why; (b) how the revenue mix (fees + interest + financing) breaks down, and how sensitive it is to regulation and rates; (c) the meaning of the transition from bank ownership to insurance-group ownership; (d) why CET1 is starting to decline, and what that says about capital plans; (e) which scenarios are reasonably plausible for interchange fees over the coming years. These are the questions that distinguish professional analysis — not the headline number.
The difference between surface-level analysis and professional thinking often lies in the variables that are not immediately visible.
The difference between surface-level analysis and professional thinking often lies in the variables that are not immediately visible.
8 Sources & Data
#SourceIdentifierType
1Isracard — 2025 Annual ReportP1728569-00.pdf (~300 pp.)Official — KPMG audited
2Annual Report Annex 2025P1728569-01.pdfOfficial — audited
3FY2025 Investor PresentationP1728580-00.pdfOfficial — company
42023 Annual Report — comparison dataP1580620-00/01.pdfOfficial — audited
5Credit ratingsMoody’s, S&P, Fitch, Midroog (17/02/2026)Rating agencies
6maya.tase.co.il — security 1157403April 2026Official — Stock Exchange

Missing data / limitations: CEO and Chairman names (Hebrew RTL extraction issue from PDF — requires source verification); precise headcount; market share as a single percentage; LCR (Liquidity Coverage Ratio); NPL as an explicit ratio (provisioning ratio used as proxy).

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9 Key Observations

Four factual observations. Not an investment conclusion. There is no rating, recommendation, price target or probability assessment.

1. The reported loss of -40M ILS in 2025 is the result of a one-time provision of ~345M ILS for the separation of life-insurance activity (POSI Run-Off), not of operating deterioration. Adjusted net income was 305M ILS and adjusted ROE was 9.8%.

2. On 24 October 2025, Harel Insurance & Finance completed the acquisition of the controlling stake in Isracard (37.05%) from Mizrahi-Tefahot Bank for ~1,246.6M ILS. The transaction changes the nature of ownership — from a regulatorily-imposed bank holding (Strom Law) to a strategic insurance-group holding.

3. Credit to public grew +18.3% in 2025 (from 7,253 to 8,583M ILS), while CET1 declined from 11.9% to 10.7% and the total capital ratio from 13.0% to 12.4%. The company responded with material capital raises: CoCo ~192M ILS + senior bonds ~1.06B ILS + a 2.5B ILS Loan 4 facility from Bank Discount.

4. No dividend was paid in 2025 (versus 99M ILS in 2024 and 68M ILS in 2023), reflecting the reported loss. At the same time, share count rose from ~200M to ~258M (~29% dilution) following equity issuances. 2025 capital allocation was directed to growth and capital cushions, not to distribution.

Disclosure — Family Office

Bakshi Finance operates as a Family Office serving qualified investors only. Mr. Yaron Bakshi held a licensed investment-advisory practice from 2008 through 2023. As of the date of this publication, the firm does not hold an investment-advisory, investment-marketing or portfolio-management licence. This document is provided for research and professional education purposes only. Nothing herein constitutes a recommendation to buy, sell, hold or take any action with respect to any security. Nothing herein is a substitute for personalised advice based on an individual’s circumstances. All decisions remain the sole responsibility of the investor. Past performance is not indicative of future results.