Comprehensive Income FY2025
2,650M ILS
IFRS-17 | 2024 restated: 2,296
AUM year-end 2025
610B ILS
+16% Y/Y | #1 in Israel
ROE FY2025
22.6%
Normalised: 26.6% | Q4/25: 28.9%
Solvency II (Sept 2025)
179%
Without transitional: 123%
Group Equity FY2025
12,584M ILS
Incl. minority | CSM: 8,392M
Credit Rating (subsidiary)
ilAAA
Maalot | Midroog: Aaa.il | International: A-/A3
Market Cap
ILS 49.05B
StockAnalysis | 08/05/2026
P/E (TTM)
15.29
StockAnalysis
P/B
3.81
StockAnalysis | 08/05/2026
Dividend Yield
2.67%
StockAnalysis | 08/05/2026
1 Company Profile
The Phoenix Holdings Ltd. is one of the largest insurance and financial-services groups in Israel. Founded in 1949, it trades on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (symbol: PHOE1, security 767012, ISIN: IL0007670123) and is a constituent of the TA-125 index. Phoenix is not a conventional insurer — it is a financial conglomerate operating across four business segments: Insurance (Life, General, Health), Asset Management (provident, pension, mutual funds, advanced-study funds, managed accounts), Distribution Agencies wholly owned by the group, and Non-Bank Credit (Gama). At year-end 2025, Phoenix manages AUM of NIS 610B — #1 in Israel, ahead of Migdal (NIS 583B). Total managed assets including insurance reserves: NIS 895B. Group equity stands at NIS 12,584M (incl. minority interest), with approximately 3,500 employees and a 14-member Board of Directors. The controlling shareholder is Belenus Lux S.a.r.l, holding 31.22% — itself owned by two US private-equity funds: Centerbridge Partners (70%) and Gallatin Point Capital LLC (30%). Key principals representing the controlling shareholder: Matthew Botein (former Co-Head, BlackRock Alternative Investors) and Lewis (Lee) Sachs (former Counselor, US Treasury; Alliance Partners).
| Segment | Strategic Role | 2025 Comprehensive Income (ILS M) |
|---|
| Insurance (Life, General, Health) | Historical core · stable margins via CSM | 1,755 · +6% Y/Y |
| Asset Management | Primary growth engine · AUM 610B ILS | 887 · +42% Y/Y |
| Distribution Agencies | Group-owned agency network | 452 |
| Non-Bank Credit (Gama) | Unique among Israeli insurers · 12.5B ILS book | 155 · +118% Y/Y |
Source: 2025 Annual Investor Presentation (P1731068-00), maya.tase.co.il (security 767012)
2 Key Financial Observations
This summary is not a recommendation. It is a factual list of key financial metrics as reported by the company.
IFRS-17 — important note before reading the numbers: In 2024 the company transitioned from IFRS-4 to IFRS-17. The 2024 restatement raised reported comprehensive income from ILS 1,760M (IFRS-4) to ILS 2,296M (IFRS-17) — a change in reporting basis, not an improvement in performance. The correct 2024→2025 comparison is 2,296→2,650 (+15%), not 1,760→2,650 (+51%) as some headlines present. Comparing 2025 (IFRS-17) to 2024 under IFRS-4 is a structural error — two different reporting bases.
Comprehensive Income — multi-year (ILS M)
| Period | Value | Basis |
|---|
| FY2020 | 601 | IFRS-4 |
| FY2021 | 866 | IFRS-4 |
| FY2022 | 1,180 | IFRS-4 |
| FY2023 | 1,322 | IFRS-4 |
| FY2024 | 1,760 | IFRS-4 |
| FY2024 (restated) | 2,296 | IFRS-17 |
| FY2025 | 2,650 | IFRS-17 |
2028 Plan Targets (per company management)
| Metric | Target |
|---|
| Assets under management (AUM) | ILS 1,300-1,500B |
| Annual comprehensive income | ILS 3,300-3,500M |
| ROE | >25% |
| CSM (Contractual Service Margin) | ILS 6,300-6,700M |
| Payout Ratio | 55% |
Important: These are management guidance — not a Bakshi Finance forecast and not a commitment.
Missing data: CEO and Chairman names, Combined/Loss/Expense Ratios in General Insurance, multi-year gross/net premium series, Dividend Yield at current share price.
Comprehensive Income — IFRS-4 vs IFRS-17 (ILS M)
AUM — Assets Under Management (ILS B)
2025 Comprehensive Income by Segment (ILS M)
Solvency II — With / Without Transitional (%)
Path to 2028 — AUM (ILS B)
Fee-Generating Revenue (ILS M)
3 Industry & Competitive Context
Insurance & Financial Services — Israel. A concentrated market dominated by five groups: The Phoenix, Migdal, Clal Insurance, Harel, and Menora Mivtachim. The regulator — the Capital Markets, Insurance and Savings Authority — sets capital requirements, Solvency II ratios, product constraints and fee caps. High barriers to entry: licence, capital requirements, complex systems, brand, and a distribution network of thousands of agents. No significant new insurance group has entered the Israeli market in decades. A semi-cyclical sector — insurance activity is relatively stable; investment income and variable management fees are highly volatile.
| Company | AUM year-end 2025 | ROE FY2025 | Distinctive Feature |
|---|
| The Phoenix (PHOE1) | 610B ILS | 22.6% | US PE ownership · Gama (non-bank credit) · #1 AUM |
| Migdal (MGDL) | 583B ILS | ~22% | Largest agent network |
| Clal Insurance | ~450B ILS | Not disclosed | Large share in General Insurance |
| Harel | ~400B ILS | Not disclosed | Leader in Health Insurance |
| Menora Mivtachim | ~350B ILS | Not disclosed | Dominance in pensions |
AUM for the three smaller companies is a secondary estimate. Official IFRS-17 data require each company's dedicated presentation.
4 Risk Factors & Items to Monitor
| Risk | Phoenix-specific context |
|---|
| Capital-markets sensitivity | A material share of profit comes from the investment portfolio and variable management fees. A bear market compresses both profit and AUM simultaneously — unusually high sensitivity given the AUM-driven mix. |
| PE Exit Risk | Centerbridge/Gallatin (31.22%) may exit over a multi-year horizon — a potential liquidity event, governance change, or block transfer — built into the PE model. |
| Regulatory risk | The Capital Markets Authority can alter capital requirements, management-fee caps (particularly on pension and provident) and product structures at any time. |
| IFRS-17 — accounting complexity | New, complex standard — limited multi-year comparability; changes in actuarial assumptions can cause jumps in comprehensive income. |
| Actuarial risk (Life) | Long-tailed; shifts in longevity, long-rate assumptions or expense assumptions affect CSM and future profitability. |
| Interest-rate risk | 63% of the nostro portfolio is in government bonds — rate moves affect yield directly and Solvency II through discount calculations. |
| Intense competition | Five dominant groups — continuous pressure on management fees and commissions. |
| Gama credit risk | 12.5B ILS book · NPL 1.9% low but ROE 19.3% high = risk premium. An economic slowdown could push NPL higher. |
| Catastrophe risk | Natural disasters, conflict, cyber events — can produce material losses in General Insurance claims. |
| Ownership concentration | Belenus holds 31.22% — material decisions are heavily dependent on the controlling shareholder. |
5 Analytical Lens — The Questions We Ask
In professional company analysis, the question is not "is this good?" but rather "through which lenses must this company be examined so that we do not miss what matters most?" At Bakshi Finance, every analysis passes through six lenses.
This framework is intended to structure analysis, not to produce an investment conclusion.
Growth
AUM grew from NIS 525B to NIS 610B in 2024→2025 (+16%). Asset Management +42%, Gama +118%. How much of the growth is organic (new contributions and new business) versus a lift from rising client-portfolio values in a bull market? Is the pace of new CSM creation (ILS 872M) sufficient to fuel forward profitability? Is management’s 2028 target (NIS 1,300-1,500B) realistic or over-ambitious?
Profitability
ROE 22.6% (26.6% normalised) under IFRS-17, versus 10-15% historically under IFRS-4. How much of that is accounting (IFRS-17 structurally raises ROE), how much is the 2024-2025 capital-markets tailwind, and how much is repeatable operating performance? What is a reasonable ROE under normal market conditions?
Leverage & Solvency
Solvency II 179% with transitional measures, 123% without. ilAAA rating for the operating subsidiary. The economic base (without transitional) is actually strengthening — from 111% in 2022 to 123% in Sept 2025. Will the internal target of 150-170% be met once transitional measures phase out? What is the sensitivity in a stress scenario?
Competitive Position
#1 in AUM — but the gap over Migdal is narrow (~30B). What is the advantage of Gama as a unique asset inside an insurer? Is Centerbridge/Gallatin ownership an advantage (operational discipline) or a drawback (exit horizon)? What is the probability of M&A in the sector?
Management Quality
Management has published detailed and ambitious 2028 targets (ROE >25%). How realistic are they versus history? Is the gap between "comprehensive income" and "net income attributable" transparently explained? How stable will management be through a possible PE Exit window?
Business Complexity / Risk
Phoenix is not a classic insurance company — it is a conglomerate with four segments, including Gama as a credit company. Under IFRS-17, multi-period comparability is constrained. How should an investor address the double sensitivity to capital markets (AUM + nostro portfolio)? What are the governance implications of 31.22% foreign ownership?
6 Scenario Framework
Scenarios are descriptive, not predictive. They outline possible conditions, not expected outcomes.
These scenarios carry no probability assessment, no preferred direction, and no expectation regarding which, if any, will materialise.
Constructive Scenario — if the following conditions hold:
Israeli and global capital markets remain on a positive trajectory (feeding AUM and variable management fees), AUM growth continues at a double-digit pace, Health & Life add new CSM at a pace of ILS 800-1,000M per year, Gama continues to scale profitability and the credit book maintains high quality (NPL below 2%). Under these conditions, the group would move toward the 2028 management targets — with no guarantee of delivery.
Base Scenario — if current trends continue:
Capital markets are stable, AUM grows at a high single-digit pace (8-12%), Asset Management profitability partially normalises (moderating from the current +42%), Insurance maintains stable CSM, and Gama grows at a pace slower than 2025. Group ROE lands in the 18-22% range — the current elevated 22.6% is partly explained by the positive market and the IFRS-17 transition.
Adverse Scenario — if the following risks materialise:
A meaningful capital-markets correction (dragging on AUM and variable management fees simultaneously), NPL in Gama rising above 3-4% on economic weakness, Solvency II transitional measures expiring before the internal target of 150-170% is met without them (Solvency drifting toward 123% or lower), or an Exit event by the controlling shareholder that creates noise in the stock. Under these conditions, ROE falls to the 10-15% range and pressure on credit ratings intensifies.
2028 management targets — important framing: comprehensive income ILS 3,300-3,500M, ROE >25%, AUM ILS 1,300-1,500B, CSM ILS 6,300-6,700M, Payout Ratio 55%. These are management guidance — not a Bakshi Finance forecast, not a commitment to delivery, and not a basis for an investment decision. They serve as a quarterly tracking framework. Partial delivery is a highly plausible scenario.
Scenarios describe conditions, not forecasts. There is no preferred direction and no probability assessment expressed in this framework.
7 How to Think About This Company
Phoenix is not a conventional "insurance company" — it is a financial conglomerate. An investor who analyses Phoenix only through the lens of premiums and claims misses the substance. Roughly four-fifths of 2025 comprehensive income (about ILS 1,900M out of 2,650) originated outside classical insurance activity — from asset management (887), agencies (452), and non-bank credit (155). The real question is not "how much does it insure" but rather "how effectively does it operate the financial ecosystem it has built around the insurance core, and how much of that profit is recurring versus temporary?"
US private-equity ownership — what it actually means. Centerbridge and Gallatin Point are professional owners with a defined holding horizon. Centerbridge is a large private-equity firm with a financial-services focus; Gallatin Point specialises in insurance. Matthew Botein (former BlackRock Alternative Investors) and Lee Sachs (former US Treasury Counselor, Alliance Partners) bring an international perspective. Such ownership typically implies strong focus on ROE, efficient capital structure and shareholder distributions. It also implies that within a 3-7 year window an exit event — a sale or staged reduction — is likely, which may affect stock liquidity and corporate governance. This is not an imminent risk, but it is part of the picture.
The IFRS-17 transition — why the 2025 jump is misleading unless you understand it. The 2024 standard transition changed the presentation of insurance contracts. Profit recognised as "one-off" under IFRS-4 is spread under IFRS-17 over the contract’s life (CSM), and vice versa. The result: 2024 restated comprehensive income rose from ILS 1,760M to ILS 2,296M (+30%) purely because of a basis change. The 2025 growth (2,296 → 2,650 = +15%) is the real economic growth, not the dramatic jump some headlines present. Comparing 2025 (IFRS-17) to 2024 (IFRS-4) is a structural mistake — two different reporting bases.
AUM-driven revenue mix + Gama — the critical distinction. A classical insurer earns from the spread between premiums, claims and costs. Phoenix, by contrast, is shifting ever more weight to AUM-driven revenue — management fees on NIS 610B of client assets. Such revenue is stable, recurring and less exposed to insurance cyclicality, but more exposed to capital-markets cyclicality. In parallel, Gama — the group’s non-bank credit company (ILS 12.5B book, ilAAA, ROE 19.3%, NPL 1.9%, LTV 40%) — has the profile of a small-to-mid-size bank inside an insurance group. No other Israeli insurance group operates a comparable credit business at this scale. An investor who understands this mix knows that Phoenix today is closer to "an asset manager with attached insurance and a credit company" than to "an insurer with adjacent asset management".
Where the analysis may go wrong. First error — treating ROE of 22-27% as a steady-state figure. The positive 2024-2025 market contributed meaningfully, and IFRS-17 structurally raises ROE. Normalisation (if the market pauses) would reduce ROE to 15-18% even with strong execution. Second error — viewing Solvency II of 179% (down from 183% in 2024) as a weakness signal. Without transitional measures, the ratio has actually risen from 111% (2022) to 123% (2025) — the underlying capital position is strengthening; the transitional reliefs are simply less needed. Third error — assuming the PE owners will hold indefinitely. An exit is part of the PE model.
What distinguishes professional analysis of Phoenix from headlines. Headlines speak of "Phoenix overtakes Migdal" or "record profit". Professional analysis addresses five other questions: (a) how much of 2025 profit is from a favourable market versus operating execution? (b) Is the pace of new-CSM creation (ILS 872M in 2025) sufficient to fuel elevated profitability for years ahead? (c) How would the company behave if Solvency II drifts toward 150%? (d) What is the Exit scenario for Centerbridge/Gallatin, and on what horizon? (e) Will Gama remain a division or become a separate asset? These are not what one buys or sells — they are what one asks before deciding.
The difference between surface-level analysis and professional thinking often lies in the variables that are not immediately visible.
The difference between surface-level analysis and professional thinking often lies in the variables that are not immediately visible.
8 Sources & Data
| # | Source | Date | Type |
|---|
| 1 | The Phoenix — 2025 Annual Investor Presentation (P1731068-00) | March 2026 | Official — Maya |
| 2 | The Phoenix — Shelf Prospectus (P1582330-00) | Ongoing | Official — Maya |
| 3 | The Phoenix — Periodic Report (P1731064-00) | 2025 | Official — Maya |
| 4 | The Phoenix — 2024/2025 Annual Report (P1736331-00) | 2025-2026 | Official — Maya |
| 5 | maya.tase.co.il — security 767012 | April 2026 | Official — Stock Exchange |
| 6 | Capital Markets Authority — Solvency II reports | Annual | Official — Regulator |
| 7 | Maalot (S&P) / Midroog (Moody's) — credit ratings | Ongoing | Official — Rating |
Missing: CEO and Chairman names, Combined/Loss/Expense Ratios in General Insurance, multi-year gross/net premium series, current Dividend Yield.
